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Abstract
In a Bayesian game some players might receive a signal regarding the speciﬁc
game actually played before it starts. We study zero-sum games where each
player receives a partial information about his own type and no information
about that of the other player, and analyze the impact the signals have on the
payoﬀs. It turns out that the functions that evaluate the value of information
share only one property across all games: monotonicity. That is, the payoﬀ
increases with the amount of information the maximizing player obtains and
decreases with the amount of information the minimizing player obtains.
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In strategic interaction some relevant aspects of the environment might be imperfectly
known to players. Such situations are classically modeled as games with incomplete
information. When the players are allowed to seek additional information or to buy
it at some cost, the question arises as to what impact diﬀerent information structures
have on the result of the interaction. This paper contributes to the study of this
question.
This problem is modeled by a game with incomplete information in which the pay-
oﬀs depend not only on the players’ actions but also on a random parameter. Before
the game starts each player obtains a partial information about the realized param-
eter. This information is determined by an information structure that speciﬁes how
the signals that the players receive stochastically depend on the realized parameter.
In the most general framework there are several reasons why evaluating the impact
of the information structure on the outcome of the game is not an easy task. First,
the interpretation of ‘outcome’ depends on the solution concept applied. Second,
for most solution concepts there are typically multiple outcomes (equilibria). Finally,
players might get correlated information, which typically has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
outcome. However, when restricting attention to zero-sum games, there is one natural
solution concept, the value, and it is unique. We further reduce the diﬃculty of the
problem by focusing on a case where the information the players get is independent
and deterministic.
There are two main approaches to analyze the connection between information
and payoﬀs. The ﬁrst is to compare two information structures and ﬁnd which is
payoﬀ-wise better than the other. This direction has been widely studied in the
literature. Blackwell (1953) compared information structures in one-player decision
problems. He proved that an information structure always yields a higher value of the
problem than another one if and only if it is more informative in a certain sense. When
restricted to deterministic information structures, namely to partitions of the state
space1, this property can be restated as follows: a partition P is more informative than
1A partition represents an information structure in the following sense: when a state k is chosen
the agents gets to know only the cell of the partition to which k belongs. More generally if a
state k is chosen an information structure sends to the agent a signal that may depend on k. Any
1Q if P reﬁnes Q. Blackwell’s result was extended to zero-sum games (and random
signals) by Gossner and Mertens (2001). It is well known that this property does
not extend to zero-sum games and various attempts have been made to understand
when it might be extended (see for instance Hirshleifer (1971), Bassan, et al. (2003),
Kamien, et al. (1990), Neyman (1991), Lehrer, et al. (2006)).
The second approach is to study the impact of an information structure on the
outcome of the interaction. A typical question in this line is whether the outcome
depends in any particular and discernable way on the information. Since each speciﬁc
game might have its own idiosyncrasies, an insight into the subject can be obtained
only by looking at all possible interactions.
For a given game we deﬁne its value-of-information function that associates any
information structure with the value of the corresponding Bayesian game. Such a
function is called a value-of-information function. We study the properties that are
common to all such functions and thereby, the connection between information and
outcomes that is not speciﬁc to a particular game.
Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) treated deterministic information structures. They char-
acterized those functions that are value-of-information functions of one-player deci-
sion problems. Blackwell’s (1953) result implies that monotonicity is a necessary
condition but it turns out not to be suﬃcient. The result of Gilboa and Lehrer has
been extended to random information structures by Azrieli and Lehrer (2004).
Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) studied the nature of value-of-information functions
in two cases: (a) one-sided information: the game depends on a state of nature
which is partially known only to player 1 (i.e., player 2 gets no information); and
(b) symmetric information: the game depends on a state of nature which is known
equally to both players. In case (a) the more reﬁned the partition the higher the
value. Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) showed that any function deﬁned over partitions
which is increasing with respect to reﬁnements is a value-of-information function of
some game with incomplete information on one side.
This paper extends the discussions to the case where both players get partial infor-
mation on the state of nature. We focus on zero-sum games with lack of information
on both sides and independent deterministic information. The type k of player 1 and
the type l of player 2 are drawn independently of each other. Each player obtains no
information about the other player’s type and just partial deterministic information
information structure in which the signal is a deterministic function of the state can be represented
by a partition.
2about his own: a player gets to know the set of types that contains his own type.
This special case has been extensively studied in the context of repeated games with
incomplete information (see Aumann and Maschler (1995), Mertens and Zamir (1971,
1980)).
Formally, the information structure is characterized by a pair of partitions: P a
partition of K, and Q a partition of L. When k is selected to be the type of player
1, he is informed of the cell of P that contains k. Similarly, when l is selected to be
the type of player 2, he is informed of the cell of Q that contains l. Then, a zero-sum
game whose payoﬀs depend on the players’ types is played. The value of this game
depends on the information structure, (P, Q). The function that associates to every
pair of partitions their corresponding value is called the value-of-information function
of this game. The goal of this paper is to characterize those functions that are a
value-of-information function of some game.
The result concerning games with one-sided information is certainly relevant to
the current two-sided information case. A value-of-information function deﬁned over
pairs (P, Q) ought to be increasing with respect to reﬁnement in P and decreasing
with respect to reﬁnement with Q. The question arises as to whether this condition is
suﬃcient for a function deﬁned over pairs of partitions to be a value-of-information-
function of some zero-sum game. We answer this question in the aﬃrmative.
The implication of this result is that essentially no further condition beyond mono-
tonicity is required to characterize the value-of-information functions. This means
that the model of Bayesian game with varying information structures can be refuted
only by observations that contradict monotonicity.
The main key of the proof is the duality between payoﬀs and information. This
means that giving more information to a player amounts to giving him more payoﬀs
in some sense (see Gossner (2006)). The proof method uses a duality technique
inspired by Fenchel conjugate of convex functions (see, Rockafellar 1970). The duality
technique has been introduced to games with incomplete information by De Meyer
and widely investigated since then (see De Meyer (1996), De Meyer and Rosenberg
(1999), De Meyer and Marino (2005), De Meyer and Moussa-Saley (2003), Laraki
(2002), Sorin (2002)). For any game with incomplete information on one side, he
deﬁned a dual game for which the value is the Fenchel conjugate of the value of the
initial game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and value-
of-information functions and the main result. Section 3 introduces the techniques of
3duality that are used in the proof, and in Section 4 we prove the result.
2 The model and the main result
2.1 Games with incomplete information on both sides
A state (k,l) is randomly drawn from a ﬁnite set K×L according to a product distri-
bution p ⊗ q. The players get a partial information about (k,l) through information
structures. Player 1’s information structure is given by a partition P of K and that of
player 2 is given by a partition Q of L. When (k,l) is selected, player 1 is informed of
the atom of P that contains k and player 2 is informed of the atom of Q that contains
l. Note that player 1 gets no information about l and player 2 gets no information
about k.
Upon getting the partial information about the state selected, the players take
actions. Player 1’s set of action is denoted by A and that of player 2 is denoted by
B. The payoﬀ function is g : K × L × A × B → R. Instead of g(k,l,a,b) we denote
by gk,l(a,b) the payoﬀ when the state is (k,l), player 1 plays a and player 2 plays b.
Player 1 tries to maximize the expected payoﬀ and player 2 to minimize it.
A pure strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) is a function from P (resp. Q) to A
(resp. B): players choose their action as a function of the information they get, i.e.
the atom of the partition in which k (resp. l) is known to be.
This game is a ﬁnite game and has a value in mixed strategies denoted by
V g
p,q(P,Q). We will focus here on how V g
p,q(P,Q) depends on P and Q, and char-
acterize the properties of this function that do not depend on a speciﬁc choice of
g,p,q.
2.2 Value-of-information function
The set of partitions of K is denoted by K and the set of partitions on L is denoted
by L.
Deﬁnition 1 A value-of-information function of games with incomplete information
on both sides and independent information is a function V from K × L to R such
that there exists a product distribution p ⊗ q over K × L, action sets A and B and a
payoﬀ function g deﬁned on K × L × A × B, such that for every P ∈ K, Q ∈ L,
V
g
p,q(P,Q) = V(P,Q).
4In this paper we characterize those functions deﬁned over K × L that are value-
of-information functions.
2.3 The main result
We ﬁrst need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 1. Partition P reﬁnes partition P0 if any atom of P0 is a union of
atoms of P.
2. A function V from K × L to R is increasing (resp. decreasing) in P (resp. Q) if
for any P, P0 in K, such that P reﬁnes P0, and any Q in L, V (P,Q) ≥ V (P0,Q)
(resp. for any P ∈ K and Q,Q0 ∈ L such that Q reﬁnes Q0, V (P,Q) ≤ V (P,Q0)).
Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) proved the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that L is a singleton. A function V deﬁned over K is a
value-of-information function iﬀ it is increasing in P.
The main result of the present paper is:
Theorem 1 A function is a value-of-information function of a game with incomplete
information on both sides and independent information iﬀ it is increasing in P and
decreasing in Q.
As in Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) this result proves that no property but the
well-known monotonicity property is common to all value of information functions.
Therefore if one models a situation by a Bayesian game and gets to observe the result
of the interaction for various information functions there is essentially no behavior of
the value as a function of information that may disqualify the Baysian model.
By the result of Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) monotonicity is clearly a necessary
condition for a function to be a value of information function. Eﬀort will be devoted
in the sequel to proving it is also suﬃcient.
3 Duality
This section is devoted to duality which is the main tool in the proof of Theorem 1.
5Deﬁnition 3 A real function deﬁned over L is a cost function if it is increasing. The
set of cost functions is denoted by C.
For every function V : K × L → R which is increasing P and decreasing in Q,
we deﬁne a dual function W as follows. This deﬁnition is reminiscent of the Fenchel
conjugation for concave functions.
For every partition P of K and every cost function c,
W(P,c) = min
Q∈L
[V (P,Q) + c(Q)].
Following the ideas of De Meyer (1996) we now deﬁne a game called the dual game
for which the value is given by W. Suppose that V is a value-of-information function,
and G(P,Q) is the game whose value is V (P,Q). Furthermore, suppose that c is
a cost function. In the dual game there are two stages. First, player 2 can buy
an information structure Q at the cost of c(Q) and this choice is publicly observed.
Then both players take part in the game G(P,Q) and get the corresponding payoﬀs.
Therefore the overall payoﬀ in the dual game is the sum of the payoﬀ in the original
game that has been played and the cost of the information structure Q that has been
chosen. The idea is that on the one hand it is always better for player 2 to get more
information but on the other hand since this information is costly, depending on the
cost he might choose to buy a less informative structure.
W is the value of the dual game.
Remark 2 Since V is increasing in its ﬁrst argument, so is W.
The following duality lemma is essential for the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 If V is increasing in P and decreasing in Q, then
V (P,Q) = max
c∈C
[W(P,c) − c(Q)]. (1)
Proof. By deﬁnition of W it is clear that for all c and all Q,
V (P,Q) ≥ W(P,c) − c(Q).
Therefore, what needs to be proved is that for all P, there exists an increasing cost
function cP such that
V (P,Q) ≤ W(P,cP) − cP(Q).
6Let cP(Q) := V (P,T ) − V (P,Q), where T is the trivial partition. This function
is indeed increasing in Q. Moreover
W(P,cP) − cP(Q) = minQ0∈L V (P,Q0) + cP(Q0) − cP(Q)
= V (P,Q∗) + V (P,T ) − V (P,Q∗) − V (P,T ) + V (P,Q)
= V (P,Q),
where Q∗ is the partition that attains the minimum. This is the desired result.
Notation: For every pair P,Q there is a cost function cP,Q that achieves the
maximum on the right-hand side of eq. (2). For a ﬁxed function V , set CV = {cP,Q;
P,Q ∈ K × L}. That is, CV is the set that contains all the cost functions cP,Q. Note
that CV is ﬁnite and that Lemma 1 implies that
V (P,Q) = max
c∈CV
[W(P,c) − c(Q)].
4 Proof of Theorem 1
The result of Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) implies that since P 7→ W(P,c) is in-
creasing, it is a value-of-information function of a game, denoted Gc, with lack of
information on one side, state space K in which player 1 is informed. Similarly, −c(·)
is a value-of-information function of a game, denoted Γc, with lack of information on
one side, state space L, in which player 2 is informed.
The main idea of Theorem 1’s proof is to deﬁne a bidual game G for which the
value will be given by V . This game is played in two stages. Before the game starts
both players are informed about the selected state through their respective partitions.
Then player 1 ﬁrst chooses a cost function c ∈ CV, this choice is publicly observed.
Finally both Gc and Γc are played simultaneously. The payoﬀ is the sum of the payoﬀs
obtained in the two games.
If player 1 chooses a cost function c independently of his information, then by
observing the selected c player 2 gets no information about the state k. In such a
case player 1 guarantees the payoﬀ W(P,c) in Gc and the payoﬀ −c(Q) in Γc. The
sum is W(P,c)−c(Q). If player 1 plays optimally he maximizes W(P,c)−c(Q) and
by Lemma 1 the value is at least V (P,Q).
We will show that an optimal c is indeed independent of player 1’s information.
In other words, although player 1 can choose the cost function in a way that may
7depend on his information, he will choose c independently of it. This will prove that
the value of the game G is exactly V (P,Q).
If player 1 uses his information when choosing c, the conditional probability over
k given the observed choice of c will be some πc, typically diﬀerent from p. Therefore,
in Gc, the value is no longer W(P,c). Rather, the value is that of the game Gc in
which k is initially drawn according to πc which can be denoted by W πc(P,c). All
these possibilities should be taken into account when analyzing the choice of player
1.
4.1 One sided information
The following lemma shows that in one-sided information games the probability p
can be taken to be the uniform probability.
Lemma 2 Let U be a value-of-information function of a game G in which k is drawn
with probability π. Then, there is a game G0 whose value-of-information function
coincides with V and, moreover, k is drawn according to the uniform distribution.
Proof. Let A, B and g be the action sets and payoﬀ function of G. Deﬁne G0 with the
same action sets and payoﬀ g0
kl(a,b) =
gkl(a,c)π(k)
pk . For any information partitions and
any strategies of the players, the expected payoﬀ in G where k,l are drawn according
to probability π ⊗ q is the same as the expected payoﬀ in G0 where k,l are drawn
according to p ⊗ q.
4.2 Auxiliary games
Fix V which is increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing in the second. We
employ Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) and deﬁne some auxiliary games which will be
needed for the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 in Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) ensures that for each Q there is a pQ
and a game GQ such that V (P,Q) is the value of GQ where player 1 is informed about
the chosen k through P, and player 2 gets no further information. Lemma 2 ensures
that the probability pQ with respect to which the state k is chosen in GQ can be taken
to be the uniform distribution over K.
Note that in this game player 2 gets no information at all and Q is just an abstract
parameter of the game, it does not model an information structure.
8In what follows we need other distributions than the uniform one. Fix a distri-
bution π over K. Let V π(P,Q) be the value of the game Gπ
Q which coincides with
GQ in all respects except for one, the initial distribution: the state k is drawn in Gπ
Q
according to π.
Deﬁne W π(P,c) to be the conjugate function of V π(P,Q):
W
π(P,c) = min
Q∈L
[V
π(P,Q) + c(Q)]. (2)
For a cost function c consider the following game, denoted G∗
c(π,P). A state k is
drawn according to the distribution π, player 1 is informed according to the partition
P and player 2 chooses a partition Q. Then, Gπ
Q is played and c(Q) is added to its
payoﬀ.
Plainly, for any initial probability π and any information partition P, the value
of this game is W π(P,c). Denote by Ac , Bc and gc the action sets and the payoﬀ
function of G∗
c(π,P).
We turn to the deﬁnition of a second auxiliary game. Suppose now that player 2
is the informed player in a one-sided information game with state space L. For each
increasing cost function c, Theorem 2 in Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) ensures that
−c is a value-of-information function. Thus, there is a one-sided information game
Γc, with a state space L, whose value is −c(Q) for any information structure of player
2, Q. Denote by A0
c, B0
c and γc its action sets and payoﬀ function (the proofs are
omitted).
Both games Γc and G∗
c will be used in the deﬁnition of a game with value V .
4.3 Concavity of value functions
We say that π is a stochastic map from P to C with ﬁnite support if for every cell
B ∈ P, π(·|B) is a distribution over C with a ﬁnite support. For stochastic map
from P to C with ﬁnite support πc denotes the probability over K given by πc(k) =
p(k)π(c|B(k)) P
B∈P p(B)π(c|B), where B(k) is the cell of P that contains k. The following lemma
phrases the concavity condition in terms of stochastic maps.
Lemma 3 1. Let h be a function from ∆(K) × K to R. Fix a partition P. h(·,P)
is concave iﬀ for every stochastic map from P to C with ﬁnite support, and every
9probability ¯ p over K,
X
c∈C
 
X
B∈P
¯ p(B)π(c|B)
!
h(πc,P) ≤ h(¯ p,P).
2. Let h be a function from ∆(K) × C × K to R. h(·,·,P) is concave iﬀ for every
stochastic map from P to C with ﬁnite support, and every probability ¯ p over K,
X
c∈C
 
X
B∈P
¯ p(B)π(c|B)
!
h(πc,P,c) ≤ h(¯ p,P,¯ c),
where
¯ c =
X
c∈C
X
B∈P
¯ p(B)π(c|B)c.
Let v(¯ p,P) be the value of a game G in which k is drawn according to probability
¯ p and player 1 is informed through P.
Lemma 4 For every P, v(·,P) is concave.
Proof. v(¯ p,P) is actually the value of the game with incomplete information whose
state space is P (i.e., the states are the cells of P), player 1 knows the state and
player 2 does not. The payoﬀ corresponding to the actions (a,b) and the state B ∈ P
is
P
k∈B
¯ p(k)
¯ p(B)gk(a,b).
It is well known that the value of such a game is a concave function of the initial
probability.
Lemma 5 Deﬁne h(π,c,P) = W π(P,c). Then, h(·,·,P) is concave.
Proof. Let π be a stochastic map with a ﬁnite support from P to C. Then, for every
partition Q,
P
c∈C
P
B∈P p(B)π(c|B)W πc(P,c) ≤
P
c∈C
P
B∈P p(B)π(c|B)(V πc(P,Q) + c(Q))
≤ V p(P,Q) + ¯ c(Q).
The ﬁrst inequality is due to eq. (2). The second inequality is due to Lemma 4 and
to the deﬁnition of ¯ c. Since the last inequality holds for every Q, by eq. (2),
P
c∈C
P
B∈P p(B)π(c|B)W πc(P,c) ≤ W p(P,¯ c).
104.4 Deﬁnition of the game
Step 0: k and l are drawn with respect to the probability p⊗q. Player 1 is informed
about k through P and player 2 about l through Q.
Step 1: Player 1 chooses a cost function c ∈ CV (possibly as a function of his
information). This choice is observed by player 2.
Step 2: The games G∗
c and Γc are played simultaneously.
The payoﬀ is the sum γc + gc.
Lemma 6 The value of this game is V (P,Q)
Proof. (i) This game is a ﬁnite game and therefore has a value in mixed strategies.
(ii) Player 1 can guarantee V (P,Q) in this game. Indeed, by choosing c independent
of his information and then playing optimally in both G∗
c and Γc. In G∗, player 1
guarantees W p(P,c). In Γc he guarantees −c(Q), so that by choosing c optimally he
can guarantee maxc∈C W p(P,c) − c(Q) = V (P,Q).
(iii) We show now that player 2 can defend V (P,Q). Fix a (behavioral) strategy
of player 1. Assume that in stage 1 he chooses c with probability π(c|B) when his
information is that the selected k is in B ∈ P.
Denote by π(c) the total probability that player 1 chooses c. πc denotes the
conditional probability on K given the choice c. Knowing the strategy of player 1,
player 2 can compute πc for each observed c and the continuation strategy of player
1 both in G∗ and in Γc. He then plays in each of these games a best reply to the
continuation strategy of player 1. Thus, knowing the chosen c, player 2 defends
W πc(P,c) in G∗ and −c(Q) in Γc. Note that the information about the distribution
over K is irrelevant to Γc and the change of the conditional probability on K does
not aﬀect the value. Therefore, the maximal payoﬀ given by this strategy of player 1
is bounded by
P
c π(c)(W πc(P,c) − c(Q)).
Denote by ¯ c :=
P
c π(c)c and note that p =
P
c π(c)πc. By Lemma 5,
X
c
π(c)(W
πc(P,c) − c(Q)) ≤ W
p(P,¯ c) − ¯ c(Q).
By the duality lemma, we conclude that the best player 1 can guarantee is at most
max
¯ c∈C
W
p(P,¯ c) − ¯ c(Q) = V (P,Q).
11Theorem 1 is a consequence of Lemma 6.
Remark: We make use of the independence between k and l in assuming that the
choice of c by player 1 does not aﬀect the value of Γc. This is so because knowing
k is irrelevant to this game. More importantly, since the information that player 2
receives is irrelevant to G∗, we could separate the games G∗ and Γc.
5 Final remarks
5.1 Non-independent probabilities
Let r ∈ R be a parameter drawn with some probability ρ. Let P and Q be partitions
of R through which player 1 and player 2 get information on the realized r. The
value-of-information function is deﬁned in a similar way it was deﬁned above. We
were unable to extend the characterization of value-of-information functions to this
case.
It is clear that value-of-information functionsare increasing in P and decreasing
in Q. We proved here that in the special case where R = K × L, ρ is the prod-
uct of independent probabilities ρ = p ⊗ q and P is a partition on K and Q on
L, then these conditions are suﬃcient. Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) characterized
value-of-information functions in the symmetric case, where P = Q. The general
characterization problem remains open.
5.2 Random signals
Our main result refers to deterministic signaling structure. Assume however that the
state is a couple (k,l) where k and l are drawn independently, but player 1 and 2
get random signals s and t that stochastically depend on k and l, respectively. We
conjecture that any function on such information structures, that is increasing when
the signal of player 1 becomes more informative and decreasing when the signal of
player 2 becomes less informative, is a value-of-information function.
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